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THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF GERRYMANDERING 
 
 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos* 
 
 
 In recent years, scholars have made great strides in measuring the extent of partisan 
gerrymandering. By and large, though, they have not yet tried to answer the questions that 
logically come next: What are the causes of district plans’ partisan skews? And what 
consequences do these skews have for democratic values? Using a unique dataset of state house 
and congressional plans’ partisan tilts from 1972 to the present, this Article addresses precisely 
these issues. It finds that single-party control of the redistricting process dramatically benefits 
the party in charge, while other mapmaking configurations have small and inconsistent effects. It 
also shows that greater black representation and greater urbanization have a modest pro-
Republican impact, albeit one that fades when Democrats are responsible for redistricting. It 
concludes as well that the harm of gerrymandering is not limited to divergences between parties’ 
seat and vote shares. The injury extends, rather, to the distortion of the representation that 
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 In recent years, some of the most important questions about partisan gerrymandering 
have been answered. How should we measure the extent to which a district plan benefits (or 
disadvantages) a party? Scholars have introduced metrics like the efficiency gap1 and partisan 
bias2 that are easy to calculate and so intuitive that courts have begun relying on them.3 What 
does the distribution of plans’ partisan fairness look like? Based on historical data spanning 
several decades, the distribution is centered on zero (or no edge for either party) and normal in 
shape.4 And how has plans’ partisan skew changed over time? In earlier periods, maps tended to 
assist Democrats, while over the last couple decades, they have tilted ever further in a 
Republican direction.5 
 
 Despite this progress, there is still much that we don’t know, especially about the causes 
and consequences of partisan gerrymandering. By causes I mean all of the factors that may affect 
a district plan’s partisan fairness. One set of these factors relates to the institution responsible for 
redistricting. We might hypothesize (in the absence of reliable evidence) that when a party has 
full control of the line-drawing process, the resulting map is usually skewed in its favor. 
Conversely, we might expect that when control of the state government is divided—or when a 
commission or court crafts the boundaries—the ensuing plan is comparatively neutral. 
 
 A second set of factors involves minority representation. A common argument is that 
Republicans profit as more districts are drawn in which minority voters are able to elect their 
preferred candidates. The logic is that these districts tend to elect Democratic candidates by 
overwhelming margins. The districts therefore waste large numbers of Democratic votes, 
enabling Republican candidates to win more of a plan’s remaining seats.  
 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency 
Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 849-55 (2015). 
2 See, e.g., Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 543 (1994). 
3 See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419-20 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (discussing partisan bias); 
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 903-10 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (discussing the efficiency gap). 
4 See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 1, at 870. 
5 See id. at 873. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2990638 
2 
 
 A final concept that is often linked to partisan fairness is political geography. Here the 
typical claim is that Democratic voters are heavily concentrated in urban areas while Republican 
voters are more efficiently distributed in suburban, exurban, and rural regions. Accordingly, 
Democrats are “naturally” packed in a small number of districts, allowing Republicans to win 
more seats (by slimmer margins) thanks to their superior spatial allocation. 
  
 Turning to the consequences of partisan gerrymandering, the most salient is how voters 
are represented by their legislators. The voting records of Democratic and Republican legislators, 
of course, are almost always different. Most Democrats take more liberal positions while most 
Republicans adopt more conservative stances. A reasonable hypothesis, then, is that as a district 
plan skews further in a Democratic (Republican) direction, the ideological midpoint of the 
legislature becomes more liberal (conservative)—even keeping constant the preferences of the 
electorate. Electing more of a party’s members for the same share of the statewide vote may be 
expected to yield ideological dividends. 
 
 These causes and consequences, it is worth emphasizing, are of more than academic 
interest. If contemporary maps tend to benefit Republicans, for instance, but this edge is due to 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act or the country’s political geography, then there may be 
little that can or should be done about the imbalance. On the other hand, if Republicans owe 
much of their advantage to control of the mapmaking process, then the case for intervention, 
judicial or political, becomes stronger. Similarly, we might not be too concerned about partisan 
gerrymandering if its damage is limited to bloodless concepts like seat and vote shares. But if 
gerrymandering distorts legislative representation—the beating heart of a democracy—then there 
may be more cause for alarm.  
 
 In this Article, I tackle these issues using a unique dataset of state house and 
congressional plans’ efficiency gaps from 1972 to 2016. (The efficiency gap is a measure of 
partisan fairness that captures in a single number how much more “cracked” and “packed” one 
party’s supporters are than the other party’s backers.6) I pair this dataset with information on the 
institution responsible for designing each plan, black and Latino representation, the level of 
urbanization, and the ideologies of members of Congress. I also employ rigorous techniques like 
fixed effects regression and nearest-neighbor matching in order to come as close as is possible in 
a non-experimental setting to establishing causation. 
 
 I find, first, that unified control of the redistricting process produces a large and 
statistically significant shift in the efficiency gap in the direction of the party in charge. This 
result holds at both the state house and the congressional level. The benefit of unified control has 
also increased in the last two decades. However, other redistricting institutions have small and 
inconsistent effects on the efficiency gap. That is, neither party consistently gains from plans 
designed by courts, commissions, or divided governments. 
 
  Second, I show that greater black representation moves the efficiency gap in a 
Republican direction while greater Latino representation does not. This result also applies to both 
state house and congressional plans. The pro-Republican shift in the efficiency gap due to greater 
black representation, though, is substantively quite small. And the shift does not occur at all 
                                                 
6 See id. at 849-55. 
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when Democrats are responsible for redistricting. The relationship between black representation 
and partisan fairness is therefore contingent, not compulsory. 
 
 Third, there is a link between urbanization and the efficiency gap in state house plans but 
not in congressional plans. At the state house level, Democrats tend to perform somewhat better 
in less urbanized states, while Republicans usually enjoy a modest advantage in more urbanized 
states. Interestingly, this link persists no matter which party is in charge of redistricting. It thus 
seems to be an intrinsic feature of contemporary state house maps (albeit one whose magnitude 
should not be overstated). 
 
 Lastly, the efficiency gap has a statistically and substantively significant impact on the 
ideological midpoint of a congressional delegation. In fact, a large pro-Democratic (pro-
Republican) efficiency gap, on the order of ten percentage points, results in a liberal 
(conservative) shift in a delegation’s ideological median of about half a standard deviation. 
Moving from a gerrymander favoring one party to a gerrymander aiding its adversary swings a 
delegation’s ideological median by almost a full standard deviation—all without changing the 
mind of a single voter. 
 
 These findings support two main conclusions. The first is that partisan intent is the most 
potent driver of district plans’ partisan fairness (or lack thereof). The deliberate manipulation of 
district lines by a party in unified control of the state government consistently affects the 
efficiency gap more than any other factor. Compared to full control of the redistricting process, 
other institutional arrangements, minority representation, and political geography pale in their 
influence. 
 
 The second conclusion is that partisan gerrymandering dramatically distorts 
congressional representation. Pro-Democratic gerrymanders make House delegations 
substantially more liberal than their states’ electorates. Pro-Republican gerrymanders have an 
even larger effect in the opposite direction. The harm of gerrymandering is thus more than seat 
shares that are out of whack with vote shares. It is the ideological skewing of representation—
and, with it, the policies that shape people’s lives. 
 
 I begin this Article by surveying the limited existing literature on the causes and 
consequences of partisan gerrymandering, using it to generate a series of testable hypotheses. 
Next, I describe the data and methods that I employ in my analysis. In the core of the Article, I 
then explore how redistricting institutions, minority representation, and political geography are 
related to partisan fairness; and how partisan fairness is related to congressional representation. 
Lastly, I comment briefly on the implications of my results for the legal and political debates 
over gerrymandering. 
 
I.   HYPOTHESES 
 
 As noted at the outset, political scientists have developed several quantitative measures of 
district plans’ partisan fairness, the best known of which are partisan bias and the efficiency gap. 
The older of these metrics, partisan bias, is the difference between a party’s seat share and 50 
percent in a hypothetical, perfectly tied election. Suppose, for instance, that a party receives 60 
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percent of the vote and 70 percent of the seats in an election. Suppose also that if the election had 
ended in a tie, the party would have received 55 percent of the seats. Then the plan’s partisan 
bias in that election is 5 percent: 55 percent minus 50 percent.7 
  
 The newer metric, the efficiency gap, is rooted in the insight that partisan gerrymandering 
is always carried out in one of two ways: the cracking of a party’s supporters among many 
districts, in which their preferred candidates lose by relatively narrow margins; or the packing of 
a party’s backers in a few districts, in which their preferred candidates win by overwhelming 
margins. Both cracking and packing produce what are known as wasted votes because they do 
not contribute to a candidate’s victory. In the case of cracking, all votes cast for the losing 
candidate are wasted; in the case of packing, all votes cast for the winning candidate, above the 
50 percent (plus one) threshold needed for victory, are wasted. The efficiency gap is simply one 
party’s total wasted votes in an election, minus the other party’s total wasted votes, divided by 
the total number of votes cast. It captures in a single number all of the cracking and packing 
choices that go into a district plan, and reveals which party is advantaged by the plan and to what 
extent.8 
 
 Unfortunately, political scientists have devoted more effort to measuring partisan 
gerrymandering than to studying its causes and consequences. Starting with its causes, perhaps 
the most intuitive explanation for a map’s partisan skew is the institution responsible for 
designing the map. When a single party fully controls the state government at the time of 
redistricting, that party typically has both the motive and the opportunity to enact a plan that 
benefits it and disadvantages its opponent. Assuming competence on the part of mapmakers, we 
may therefore hypothesize that unified control of the state government produces a partisan tilt in 
favor of the party in charge. On the other hand, other redistricting institutions—like bipartisan 
commissions, courts required to replace unlawful plans, and state governments where control is 
divided—have no obvious reason to favor either party. These institutions may inadvertently craft 
unbalanced maps at times, but we should not expect their handiwork to be systematically biased 
in either a Democratic or a Republican direction.  
 
 The available literature mostly confirms this reasoning with respect to unified control of 
the state government. Though they did not control for any other variables, Richard Niemi and 
Simon Jackman found that state house plans designed entirely by Democrats from 1970 to 1986 
had an average pro-Democratic partisan bias of 4.1%, while wholly Republican-drafted maps 
had an average pro-Republican bias of 4.5%.9 Similarly, using a model that incorporated lagged 
bias and whether a plan was redrawn in a given year, Andrew Gelman and Gary King showed 
that unified partisan control produced a 3 percentage point swing in bias in a party’s favor in 
                                                 
7 See generally, e.g., ANTHONY J. MCGANN ET AL., GERRYMANDERING IN AMERICA: THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE FUTURE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 56-96 (2016); Gelman & 
King, supra note 2, at 543; Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for 
Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2, 6-13 (2007). The party’s seat share in the 
counterfactual tied election (here, 55 percent) is computed by assuming that every district in the plan swings by the 
same amount (here, 10 percent) that is necessary to bring the statewide vote to exactly 50 percent. 
8 See generally, e.g., Eric McGhee, Measuring Partisan Bias in Single-Member District Electoral Systems, 
39 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 55, 68-70 (2014); Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 1, at 849-55. 
9 See Richard G. Niemi & Simon Jackman, Bias and Responsiveness in State Legislative Districting, 16 
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 183, 195 (1991). 
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state house elections from 1968 to 1988.10 At the congressional level, Janet Campagna and 
Bernard Grofman did not detect significant differences in bias between Democratic- and 
Republican-controlled states in 1980 and 1982.11 But using a cross-sectional model that also took 
into account minority population and urbanization, Nicholas Geodert determined that, in 2012, 
Democratic control shifted the efficiency gap by 17 percentage points in a Democratic direction, 
while Republican control shifted it by 14 points in a Republican direction.12 
 
 With respect to other redistricting institutions, I am unaware of any work that analyzes 
their effect on the direction of maps’ partisan skew. However, Bruce Cain and his coauthors 
found that, in 2002, state house plans designed by commissions had an average absolute partisan 
bias of 4.0%, compared to 11.7% for maps crafted by legislatures.13 Likewise, in an earlier 
article, I used fixed effects models to examine how commission usage, court usage, and divided 
government influenced the magnitude of the efficiency gap in state house and congressional 
elections from 1972 to 2012.14 I concluded that all of these institutions reduced its size 
somewhat, with the impact most pronounced for divided government.15 
 
 The next factor that is often linked to partisan fairness is minority representation. In 
certain circumstances, the Voting Rights Act requires jurisdictions to create districts where 
minority voters are numerous enough to be able to elect their preferred candidates.16 These 
districts tend to elect Democrats by large margins; minority voters lean heavily Democratic, so it 
stands to reason that when many of them are placed in certain districts, these districts tilt strongly 
in a Democratic direction. At the level of an entire plan, though, the construction of minority-
opportunity districts may be expected to benefit Republicans. If minority voters (and Democrats) 
are concentrated in a small number of districts, then Republicans may be dispersed more 
                                                 
10 See Gelman & King, supra note 2, at 553. Note that this is the swing relative to a bipartisan plan; the 
swing is twice as large relative to a plan designed by the opposite party. 
11 See Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in 1980s Congressional 
Redistricting, 52 J. POL. 1242, 1252 (1990). 
12 See Nicholas O. Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography? How Democrats Won the Popular Vote but 
Lost the Congress in 2012, RES. & POL., Apr.-June 2014, at 6 [hereinafter Goedert, Gerrymandering or 
Geography?] (using a metric closely related, but not identical, to the efficiency gap); see also Nicholas Goedert, The 
Case of the Disappearing Bias: A 2014 Update to the “Gerrymandering or Geography” Debate, RES. & POL., Oct.-
Dec. 2015, at 5 [hereinafter Goedert, Disappearing Bias] (reporting a pro-Democratic boost of 11 percentage points, 
and a pro-Republican boost of 13 percentage points, in the 2014 election). In an unpublished expert report, Simon 
Jackman also used a model with fixed effects for states and years to analyze the impact of Democratic and 
Republican control on the efficiency gap in congressional elections from 1972 to 2016. He found that Democratic 
control produced a 3.4 percentage point swing in a Democratic direction, while Republican control produced a 5.5 
percentage point swing in a Republican direction. See Simon Jackman, Assessing the Current North Carolina 
Congressional Districting Plan 32-38 (Mar. 1, 2017). 
13 See Bruce E. Cain et al., Redistricting and Electoral Competitiveness in State Legislative Elections 12 
(Apr. 13, 2007); see also Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of the Citizens 
Commission Final Plans, 4 CAL. J. POL. & POL’Y 1, 22-24 (2012) (finding that California’s redistricting commission 
reduced its plans’ partisan biases from about 5% to almost zero). 
14 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Arizona and Anti-Reform, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 477, 496-98. 
15 See id. at 498-501; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of Consequentialist 
Criteria, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 669, 710-11 (2013) (reporting similar results for the 1992-2012 period). 
16 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (setting forth the framework for establishing racial vote 
dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). 
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efficiently across a map’s remaining districts. These remaining districts may be both whiter and 
more Republican than if the minority-opportunity districts had not been drawn.17 
 
 However, greater minority representation may not necessarily lead to a Republican edge. 
This is because it is possible to craft minority-opportunity districts that do not waste inordinate 
numbers of Democratic votes. How? Simply by keeping these districts’ proportions of minority 
voters (and Democrats) relatively low, and their shares of Republicans relatively high. Then it is 
Republicans, not Democrats, who waste more votes in the districts. Republican line-drawers, of 
course, have no incentive to enhance Democratic performance in this way; if they have to create 
minority-opportunity districts, they would prefer to pack them with minority voters (and 
Democrats). Democratic mapmakers, though, have every reason to employ this strategy, which 
lets them comply with the Voting Rights Act without compromising their partisan objectives. 
Accordingly, we might hypothesize that the relationship between minority representation and 
Republican advantage is strongest under unified Republican control of redistricting, weakest 
under unified Democratic control, and intermediate under other institutions.18 
  
 Regrettably, the existing literature has not probed this link; not a single study has 
considered how minority representation may affect partisan bias, the efficiency gap, or any other 
measure of partisan fairness. In the 1990s, however, scholars including David Canon, Kevin Hill, 
David Lublin, and Stephen Voss analyzed how the sharp increase in black representation in that 
decade influenced the share of legislative seats held by Democrats.19 The conclusion of this work 
was that Democrats lost around ten congressional seats due to the creation of additional 
minority-opportunity districts,20 as well as two to sixteen state house seats in each of ten 
southern states.21 In an earlier article, I also used fixed effects models to assess how minority 
representation and Democratic seat share were related in state house elections from 1972 to 2014 
under different configurations of control over redistricting.22 I found that there was a tradeoff 
between minority representation and Democratic seat share, and that this tradeoff was 
exacerbated by unified Republican control but alleviated by unified Democratic control.23 
 
 A final concept that is regularly tied to partisan fairness in both academic and popular 
commentary is political geography.24 Political geography can mean many things, but I use the 
term here to refer to the spatial distribution of Democratic and Republican voters. If one party’s 
                                                 
17 See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1384 (2016) 
(describing the potential tradeoff between descriptive and substantive representation in more detail). 
18 For similar hypotheses, see Adam B. Cox & Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan 
Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 564-79 (2011); Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1384-85. 
19 See, e.g., DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 74 (1999); DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: 
RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 111 (1997); Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation 
of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans?: An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern 
States, 57 J. POL. 384, 398 (1995); David Lublin & D. Stephen Voss, The Missing Middle: Why Median-Voter 
Theory Can’t Save Democrats from Singing the Boll-Weevil Blues, 65 J. POL. 227, 231, 233 (2003). 
20 See CANON, supra note 19, at 74, 257; LUBLIN, supra note 19, at 111-14. 
21 See Lublin & Voss, supra note 19, at 802 tbl.2. 
22 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1388-89. 
23 See id. at 1389-93. 
24 For academic commentary, see the discussion in the next paragraph. For popular commentary, see BILL 
BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2009). 
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supporters (say, Democrats in urban areas) are highly concentrated while the other party’s 
backers (say, Republicans in suburban, exurban, and rural regions) are more evenly allocated, 
then it is possible that most district plans—even plans drawn without any partisan intent—will 
favor the more efficiently dispersed Republicans. These plans may “naturally” pack Democrats 
in a small number of urban districts where their preferred candidates win by enormous margins. 
The plans may also “naturally” crack Democrats among a large number of suburban, exurban, 
and rural districts where their candidates of choice lose relatively narrowly. 
 
 I place “naturally” in quotation marks in order to foreshadow another hypothesis: that 
political geography may have only a small and contingent relationship with partisan fairness. In 
any jurisdiction with more than a handful of seats, there is a near infinite number of ways in 
which the districts can be drawn. There is a near infinite number of ways, that is, in which voters 
can be spatially aggregated. Many of these configurations may produce a bias in favor of the 
more efficiently distributed party. But a substantial number may not—for instance, if districts 
tend to combine a slightly larger group of urban Democrats with a slightly smaller set of 
suburban, exurban, or rural Republicans. And as with minority representation, how political 
geography translates into partisan fairness may depend on the institution responsible for 
redistricting. Republicans may happily exploit spatial patterns by crafting many wholly urban 
(and heavily Democratic) districts. In contrast, Democrats may defy these patterns by designing 
more heterogeneous districts that merge urban and non-urban voters.25 
 
 Goedert is the only scholar who has included a measure of political geography—each 
state’s level of urbanization—in a model of partisan fairness.26 Relying on a pair of cross-
sectional analyses, he found that more urbanized states had more pro-Republican efficiency gaps 
at the congressional level in 2012, but that this link disappeared in 2014.27 Also worth noting 
here are the redistricting simulations carried out by Jowei Chen, David Cottrell, and Jonathan 
Rodden.28 These authors used computer algorithms to generate large numbers of state legislative 
and congressional plans (with equal population, contiguity, and compactness as criteria), and 
then compared the parties’ seat shares in the actual and simulated plans. At the state legislative 
level and using 2000 data, most (but not all) actual and simulated plans favored Republicans.29 
At the congressional level and using 2008 data, actual plans were about evenly divided between 
those that benefited Democrats and those that benefited Republicans relative to the simulated 
plans.30 
 
                                                 
25 For good discussions of these line-drawing strategies, see Cox & Holden, supra note 18, and John N. 
Friedman & Richard T. Holden, Optimal Gerrymandering: Sometimes Pack, but Never Crack, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 
113 (2008).  
26 See Goedert, Disappearing Bias, supra note 12, at 5; Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography?, supra 
note 12, at 6. 
27 See id. Again, Goedert used a metric similar but not identical to the efficiency gap in his analysis.  
28 See Jowei Chen & David Cottrell, Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerrymandering: 
Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the U.S. House, 44 ELEC. STUD. 329 
(2016); Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in 
Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239 (2013). 
29 See Chen & Rodden, supra note 28, at 263. 
30 See Chen & Cottrell, supra note 28, at 335, 337. 
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 Shifting gears from the causes to the consequences of partisan gerrymandering, a simple 
logical chain connects it to distorted representation—that is, representation out of kilter with the 
views of the electorate. Take a state whose voters are closely divided in both partisan and 
ideological terms. Next assume that a severe pro-Democratic (pro-Republican) gerrymander is in 
place, resulting in the election of significantly more Democrats (Republicans) than would have 
won office under a neutral plan. Posit further that Democratic and Republican legislators differ 
in their voting records and ideologies, with Democrats being more liberal and Republicans being 
more conservative.31 The necessary conclusion is that under the pro-Democratic (pro-
Republican) gerrymander, the state legislature or congressional delegation is more liberal 
(conservative) than it would have been under a neutral map. Likewise, the legislature or 
delegation is more liberal (conservative) than the state’s closely divided electorate. 
 
 In a forthcoming article, Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw assess exactly this 
claim at the state house level. Using a fixed effects model for elections from 1992 to 2012, they 
find that a one standard deviation pro-Democratic (pro-Republican) shift in the efficiency gap 
led to about a 0.4 standard deviation pro-liberal (pro-conservative) shift in the ideology of the 
median state house member.32 Intriguingly, Tausanovitch and Warshaw extend this analysis 
from representation to actual policy outcomes. They show that a one standard deviation pro-
Democratic (pro-Republican) shift in the efficiency gap also pushed a state’s overall set of 
policies by 2.4 percentage points in a liberal (conservative) direction.33 By comparison, this is 
about twice the impact of switching the governor from one party to the other.34 
 
 To recap, redistricting theory and available scholarship support four hypotheses about the 
explanations and implications of district plans’ partisan fairness. First, that unified control of the 
line-drawing process predictably benefits the party in charge, while other institutions have small 
and erratic partisan effects. Second, that greater minority representation leads to a Republican 
advantage, except perhaps when Democrats are responsible for redistricting. Third, that greater 
urbanization also favors Republicans, also except maybe when Democrats draw the lines. And 
fourth, that maps’ partisan tilt is a significant driver of their representational skew. In the balance 
of the Article, I test these hypotheses using nearly fifty years of data at both the state house and 
congressional levels. 
 
II.  DATA AND METHODS 
 
 The principal datasets on which I rely are of the efficiency gap by state and year in state 
house and congressional elections. At the state house level, there are 786 observations from 207 
district plans and 41 states, spanning elections from 1972 to 2014. At the congressional level, 
there are 512 observations from 136 plans and 25 states (all with at least 7 seats), spanning 
                                                 
31 This assumption has become increasingly accurate over the last few decades. See The Polarization of the 
Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW.ORG (Jan. 30, 2016), http://voteview.org/political_polarization_2015.htm 
(showing the rising polarization of members of Congress); Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping 
of American Legislatures, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 530 (2011) (same for state legislatures). 
32 See Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, The Efficiency Gap: Implications for Representation in 
Legislative Positions and State Policy, 16 ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 12). 
33 See id. (manuscript at 14). 
34 See id. 
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elections from 1972 to 2016.35 These scores are computed using actual election results whenever 
districts were contested by both major parties, and using imputations whenever races did not 
feature two major-party candidates.36 Negative values indicate a Republican advantage (that is, 
more Democratic than Republican wasted votes); positive values denote a Democratic edge. As 
noted earlier, at both the state house and congressional levels, the historical distribution of the 
efficiency gap is normal and centered very close to zero.37 At both levels, the efficiency gap has 
also trended in a Republican direction over the last three redistricting cycles.38  
 
 With respect to the potential causes of district plans’ partisan skews, I compiled data on 
most of them in previous work. The institution responsible for redistricting is coded by plan 
using five dummy variables: unified Democratic control, unified Republican control, court, 
commission, or divided government.39 Minority representation is coded using the shares of state 
house or congressional seats held by African American or Latino legislators.40 And consistent 
with Goedert’s analysis, I rely on each state’s level of urbanization as a proxy for political 
geography.41 Urbanization does not directly capture the spatial distribution of Democratic or 
Republican voters, but unfortunately, there is no currently available and time-variant measure 
that does. 
 
 With respect to the representational consequences of district plans’ partisan tilts, I code 
House members’ ideologies using the DW-Nominate scores developed by Keith Poole and 
Howard Rosenthal.42 These scores are derived from House members’ roll call voting records, 
and capture on a single left-right axis the members’ “ideal points”—that is, the “unique set[s] of 
policies that they ‘prefer’ to all others.”43 The scores range from roughly -1 (very liberal) to +1 
(very conservative); as a point of calibration, the House median in the most recent session for 
                                                 
35 These scores were calculated by Simon Jackman. See Simon Jackman, Assessing the Current Wisconsin 
State Legislative Districting Plan 20 (July 7, 2015) [hereinafter Jackman, Wisconsin Report]; Simon Jackman, 
Assessing the Current North Carolina Congressional Districting Plan 20 (Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Jackman, 
North Carolina Report]. 
36 See Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 35, at 21-27; Jackman, Wisconsin Report, supra note 
35, at 24-31. 
37 See Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 35, at 28; Jackman, Wisconsin Report, supra note 35, at 
7. 
38 See Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 35, at 30; Jackman, Wisconsin Report, supra note 35, at 
45. 
39 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 14, at 497; Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1388-89. 
40 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1367. I note that these seat shares are not identical to the 
proportions of minority-opportunity districts. The two measures are very highly correlated, though. See 
Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1362. 
41 See Goedert, Disappearing Bias, supra note 12, at 5; Goedert, Gerrymandering or Geography?, supra 
note 12, at 6; see also 2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Areas Criteria, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/urban-rural-2010.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2017) [hereinafter 
Census Urbanization Data]. 
42 See DW-NOMINATE Scores With Bootstrapped Standard Errors, VOTEVIEW.ORG (Sept. 17, 2015), 
http://www.voteview.com/dwnomin.htm. 
43 Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in Congress, 
State Legislatures, and Cities, 75 J. POL. 330, 331 (2013). 
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which data is available (2013-2014) was about 0.5.44 (I do not examine state legislators’ 
ideologies because Tausanovitch and Warshaw have already done so quite thoroughly.45) 
 
 In the main analysis, I regress the efficiency gap on the five dummy variables for the 
institution responsible for redistricting,46 black and Latino seat share, and urbanization. I also 
include controls for the Democratic share of the statewide vote (to take into account the overall 
electoral environment) and the number of seats in the plan (due to the efficiency gap’s greater 
“lumpiness” as the number of seats declines). I further include fixed effects for states and years, 
and cluster standard errors by plan.47 The state-year fixed effects represent a rigorous 
methodological choice for panel data. They control for any time trends as well as for any fixed 
differences among states due to politics, economics, demography, culture, or other factors.48 
 
 In a series of robustness checks, I replace state fixed effects with state random effects; 
add a control for the lagged efficiency gap (that is, the efficiency gap in the previous election); 
and change the dependent variable to partisan bias.49 To further probe the impact of control of 
the redistricting process, I also use a technique known as nearest-neighbor matching.50 This 
method identifies observations that are as similar as possible in terms of a series of covariates 
(Democratic share of the statewide vote, black seat share, and urbanization)—but that differ in 
the institution responsible for redistricting.51 The method yields a “treatment effect” that 
corresponds to the change in the efficiency gap that occurs when observations are “treated” with 
a particular redistricting institution. Additionally, to determine whether the influence of black 
seat share or urbanization varies by party, I run two more models with interactions between these 
variables, respectively, and unified Democratic and Republican control of redistricting.52 
 
 The final model I specify addresses the representational implications of district plans’ 
partisan skews. The dependent variable is the median DW-Nominate score of the members of 
each House delegation. The independent variables are the efficiency gap and the Democratic 
share of the statewide vote. I again include fixed effects for states and years, and cluster standard 
                                                 
44 I note that I use only the first-dimension DW-Nominate scores in this analysis. 
45 See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 32. 
46 Divided government is the omitted variable. 
47 For a similar efficiency gap analysis also including state-year fixed effects and clustering standard errors 
by plan, see Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 35, at 34. 
48 For a good discussion (and application) of fixed effects regression, see Eric M. McGhee et al., A Primary 
Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator Ideology, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 337, 343 (2014). 
49 For similar robustness checks, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1360, 1376, 1391; and 
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 32 (manuscript at 12, 14). Because partisan bias becomes less reliable in less 
competitive electoral settings, see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 1, at 855-62, when I use it as the 
dependent variable I only consider cases where the statewide vote was closer than 55% to 45%. 
50 For a useful discussion, see Alberto Abadie & Guido W. Imbens, Bias-Corrected Matching Estimators 
for Average Treatment Effects, 29 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 1 (2011). Per Abadie and Imbens’s recommendation, I use 
the bias-adjustment estimator when conducting the nearest-neighbor matching. 
51 I define the “control” group for each “treatment” as follows: for unified Democratic control, all plans 
except those under unified Republican control; for unified Republican control, all plans except those under unified 
Democratic control; and for court usage, commission usage, and divided government, all plans except those under 
unified Democratic or Republican control. In other words, the control group never includes plans enacted under 
single-party rule. I also do not include Latino seat share as a covariate due to insufficient variation and to reduce the 
number of factors that must be matched. 
52 For a similar analysis, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 17, at 1388-89. 
11 
 
errors by state. And to establish robustness, I add a control for the lagged median DW-Nominate 
score; replace the median with the average DW-Nominate score; and replace the efficiency gap 





A. Main Analysis 
 
Beginning with the main analysis, Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix display the results of 
the state house and congressional models, respectively.53 In both models, unified Democratic 
control of redistricting is statistically significant and associated with a pro-Democratic shift in 
the efficiency gap of 3 to 3.5 percentage points.54 Unified Republican control is also statistically 
significant, but interestingly, its impact is about twice as large at the congressional level (about -
4.5 percentage points) as at the state house level (roughly -2 percentage points). Neither 
commission usage nor court usage rises to statistical significance in the state house model; in the 
congressional model, commission usage again fails to do so, but court usage results in a pro-
Democratic shift in the efficiency gap of about 3 percentage points.  
 
Turning to minority representation, there is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between black seat share and the efficiency gap at both the state house and 
congressional levels. That is, as black legislators win more seats, the efficiency gap moves in a 
Republican direction. There is no such relationship, however, between Latino seat share and the 
efficiency gap in either state house or congressional elections. Lastly, urbanization is negatively 
and significantly linked to the efficiency gap at the state house level but not at the congressional 
level. It is thus only at the former level that Republicans perform better in more urbanized states 
(and Democrats enjoy an edge in more rural ones). 
 
To make these results more concrete, Figure 1 shows the impact on the efficiency gap of 
adopting a particular redistricting institution and of increasing each of the continuous variables 
(black seat share, Latino seat share, and urbanization) by one standard deviation.55 (The left 
panel is for state houses; the right panel is for congressional delegations.) A few points stand out 
from the charts. First, the efficiency gap effects are generally larger at the congressional level 
than at the state house level. This is likely because congressional delegations typically have 
fewer seats than state houses, meaning that each congressional seat that changes hands represents 
a more sizable gain or loss in percentage point terms. Second, the confidence interval for 
commission usage at the congressional level is larger than for any other redistricting institution. 
The probable explanation is that not many observations involve congressional plans designed by 
commissions (only 37 out of 512), and a few of these plans exhibited highly variable efficiency 
gaps. 
 
                                                 
53 See infra app. tbls.1-2. 
54 Again, divided government is the omitted variable. The coefficients therefore represent the impact of 
adopting a particular redistricting institution relative to the benchmark of divided government. 
55 For the sake of simplicity, I omit the control variables (the Democratic share of the statewide vote and 
the number of seats in each plan) from the figure. 
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Third, the substantive impact of increasing black seat share by one standard deviation is 
quite small: only about a 1 percentage point shift in the efficiency gap in a Republican direction. 
Thus even though the negative relationship between black seat share and the efficiency gap is 
statistically significant, it is not particularly meaningful in practical terms. And fourth, in 
contrast, the substantive impact of increasing urbanization by one standard deviation is 
considerable—roughly equivalent to switching from divided government to unified Republican 
control of redistricting. However, the confidence interval for urbanization is also large, 
especially at the congressional level, and explains why the variable fails to attain statistical 
significance in that model despite its seemingly sizable effect.  
 
 These results are mostly confirmed by the robustness checks.56 Unified Democratic 
control remains statistically significant in all of the alternative state house models and in all but 
one of the alternative congressional models. Unified Republican control stays statistically 
significant in every other model permutation. Commission usage fails to attain significance in 
every state house model and in all but one congressional model. Court usage remains statistically 
insignificant in every state house model, and significant in one additional congressional model. 
Black seat share continues to have a negative and statistically significant relationship with the 
efficiency gap in four of the six alternative models. Latino seat share never exhibits a significant 
relationship. And urbanization remains a statistically significant driver of the efficiency gap in 
two of the other three state house models, while it remains insignificant in all of the other 
congressional models. We can conclude, then, that the outcomes of the main analysis are 
strongly corroborated by the additional testing. 
 




The left panel is for state house elections; the right panel is for congressional elections. The point estimates represent 
the impact on the efficiency gap of adopting a particular redistricting institution or increasing a continuous variable 





                                                 
56 These checks are also displayed in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. See infra app. tbls.1-2. 
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B. Nearest-Neighbor Matching 
 
 I turn next to the nearest-neighbor matching, which further illuminates how different 
redistricting institutions affect the efficiency gap. (The technique can be used only for categorical 
variables, and so is inapplicable to the continuous variables in the preceding analysis.) Figure 2 
depicts the efficiency gap impact of “treating” an observation with a particular institution—that 
is, comparing that observation to another entry that is as similar as possible in terms of several 
covariates, but that differs in the author of its district plan.57 Again, the left panel is for state 
houses, while the right panel is for congressional delegations. Because there is some evidence 
that unified control of redistricting has become more potent in recent years,58 the charts include 
separate estimates for the entire modern period, the 1970s and 1980s cycles, and the cycles from 
the 1990s to the present.  
 
 Starting with unified Democratic control, its treatment effect has been fairly constant at 
the state house level, varying only modestly between the 1972-1990 period (6.0%) and the 1992-
2014 period (4.3%). At the congressional level, in contrast, the impact of unified Democratic 
control on the efficiency gap rose dramatically between the 1970s and 1980s (1.6%) and the 
1990s, 2000s, and 2010s (7.9%). Next, the treatment effect of unified Republican control nearly 
doubled at the state house level from the earlier period (-3.3%) to the later one (-5.4%). And its 
impact more than doubled at the congressional level (-3.8% to -10.5%).  
 
  With respect to redistricting commissions, their treatment effect was substantively small 
and statistically indistinguishable from zero at all times in state house elections. In congressional 
elections, their impact was larger but still statistically insignificant. Courts present a more mixed 
picture. For the entire modern period, the efficiency gap impact of a court-drawn plan was close 
to zero at the state house level but reasonably pro-Democratic at the congressional level (3.2%). 
At both levels, the impact of a court-drawn plan became somewhat more pro-Republican over 
time. Lastly, the treatment effect of divided government was consistently near zero and 
statistically insignificant in state house elections. But in congressional elections, its impact was 
quite pro-Republican (-5.3%), albeit less so over the last three cycles (-2.5%). 
 
  It is important to note that these results cannot be compared directly to the outputs of the 
earlier regression analysis. The benchmark for comparison is different: divided government in 
the regression analysis,59 as opposed to a control group of all other observations not under 
single-party rule here.60 The regression analysis also includes several controls absent here: 
Latino seat share, the number of seats in each plan, as well as the state and year fixed effects. 
                                                 
57 The makeup of the “control” group for each redistricting institution is described above. See supra note 
51. However, the results are not appreciably different if all other observations are used as the control group. Nor do 
the results materially vary if the covariates are amended to include Latino seat share, black population share, Latino 
population share, the number of seats in a plan, and/or the election year. And no treatment effect is shown for 
commissions at the congressional level between 1972 and 1990 because none were used in this period (for cases in 
my database). 
58 See Jackman, North Carolina Report, supra note 35, at 34 (finding that unified Democratic control has 
its largest impact on the efficiency gap from 2002 to 2016, and that unified Republican control has its largest impact 
from 1992 to 2016). 
59 See supra note 46. 
60 See supra note 51. 
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Nevertheless, the consistency of the two techniques’ outcomes is striking. In both cases, unified 
control of the state government consistently and sizably benefits the party in charge. In both 
cases, other redistricting institutions also tend to have small and uneven effects on the efficiency 
gap. The nearest-neighbor matching therefore adds detail to the portrait already painted—in 
particular, by showing how the impact of unified control has grown in recent years. But it does 
not unsettle any of the prior conclusions. 
 




The left panel is for state house elections; the right panel is for congressional elections. The point estimates represent 
the “treatment effect” of adopting a particular redistricting institution, relative to a control group of other 
observations not under single-party rule. The bars to the left and right of the point estimates denote 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
C. Interactive Analysis 
 
 The next analysis investigates whether the influence of black seat share and urbanization 
on the efficiency gap varies based on the party responsible for redistricting. Table 3 in the 
Appendix displays the results of state house and congressional models identical to those 
presented earlier—except that they now include interactions between unified Democratic control 
and black seat share and between unified Republican control and black seat share.61 Using these 
models, Figure 3 shows predicted efficiency gap values for different black seat shares in state 
houses and congressional delegations, under conditions of unified Democratic control, unified 
Republican control, and non-unified control.62 All other variables are held constant at their 
means. As before, the left panel is for state houses, while the right panel is for congressional 
delegations.  
 
 When neither party is solely responsible for redistricting, there is a negative relationship 
(statistically significant only in the congressional model) between black seat share and the 
efficiency gap. As black seat share increases from 0% to 15% (about a standard deviation above 
its mean), the efficiency gap declines from roughly 0% to -2% in the state house model, and 
                                                 
61 See infra app. tbl.3. I do not carry out this analysis for Latino seat share since there is no indication that it 
significantly affects the efficiency gap. 
62 I show black seat share up to approximately its 95th percentile, or 25%. 
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from roughly 3% to -2% in the congressional model. This negative relationship is amplified by 
unified Republican control. Under this configuration, as black seat share rises from 0% to 15%, 
the efficiency gap falls from about -1% to -6% in the state house model, and from about 0% to -
7% in the congressional model. Unified Democratic control, on the other hand, transforms the 
relationship. At the state house level, it raises the efficiency gap at all levels of black seat share, 
so that as black seat share grows from 0% to 15%, the efficiency gap only drops from roughly 
3% to 0%. And at the congressional level, unified Democratic control reverses the link, so that 
the efficiency gap rises from 3% to 4% as black seat share goes from 0% to 15%. 
 




The left panel is for state house elections; the right panel is for congressional elections. Predicted efficiency gaps are 
shown separately for the scenarios of unified Democratic control, unified Republican control, and non-unified 
control. Black seat share varies from 0% to 25%; all other variables are held constant at their means. 
 
 Table 4 in the Appendix repeats this analysis, only this time with urbanization interacted 
with unified Democratic control and unified Republican control.63 Figure 4 depicts predicted 
efficiency gap values for different levels of urbanization in state houses and congressional 
delegations, under conditions of unified Democratic control, unified Republican control, and 
non-unified control.64 Again, all other variables are held constant at their means, the left panel is 
for state houses, and the right panel is for congressional delegations. 
 
 When neither party has full line-drawing authority, there is a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between urbanization and the efficiency gap. As urbanization increases 
from 60% to 80% (or about a standard deviation below to a standard deviation above its mean), 
the efficiency gap declines from roughly 2% to -3% in the state house model, and from roughly 
10% to -2% in the congressional model. This negative relationship becomes somewhat (though 
not statistically significantly) stronger under unified Republican control. Under this 
configuration, as urbanization rises from 60% to 80%, the efficiency gap falls from about -1% to 
-5% in the state house model, and from about 6% to -6% in the congressional model. The 
relationship is also alleviated only modestly (and not statistically significantly) by unified 
                                                 
63 See infra app. tbl.4. 
64 I show urbanization from roughly its 10th percentile (50%) to its 90th percentile (90%). 
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Democratic control. With Democrats in charge of redistricting, as urbanization grows from 60% 
to 80%, the efficiency gap drops from roughly 4% to 1% in the state house model, and from 
roughly 10% to 2% in the congressional model. 
  
 There is an interesting difference, then, in how black seat share and urbanization interact 
with party control. Both parties are able to manipulate the link between black seat share and the 
efficiency gap—Republicans by tilting plans further in their favor as black representation 
increases, Democrats by negating the connection between black representation and partisan 
fairness altogether. In contrast, neither party has the capacity to sway substantially the 
relationship between urbanization and the efficiency gap. This relationship does shift in each 
party’s direction when it is solely responsible for redistricting, but not to the point of statistical 
significance.  
 
What accounts for this contrast? A likely explanation is that black seat share is a more 
malleable variable than urbanization. In other words, it is easier for each party to achieve a 
certain level of black representation and an efficiency gap that benefits it. Democrats simply 
create black-opportunity districts that elect black-preferred candidates by relatively slim margins; 
Republicans simply craft such districts that propel such candidates to overwhelming victories. 
Urbanization, on the other hand, may be harder for the parties to finesse. In a highly urbanized 
state, for example, Democrats may have little choice but to design numerous heavily Democratic 
districts in the urban core. In a more rural state, similarly, Republicans may be constrained in 
cracking or packing Democratic voters who are dispersed relatively evenly. This is not to say, of 
course, that urbanization is destiny for purposes of partisan fairness. The point is only that the 
natural pull of urbanization may be more difficult for the parties to resist than that of black 
representation. 
 




The left panel is for state house elections; the right panel is for congressional elections. Predicted efficiency gaps are 
shown separately for the scenarios of unified Democratic control, unified Republican control, and non-unified 






D. Representational Analysis 
 
 The final analysis considers the representational implications—not the causes—of district 
plans’ partisan tilts. Before getting to the regression results, Figure 5 plots the median DW-
Nominate score of each congressional delegation versus the Democratic share of the statewide 
vote.65 Separate lowess curves are included for plans with large Democratic efficiency gaps 
(greater than 10%), large Republican efficiency gaps (less than -10%), and intermediate 
efficiency gaps (between -10% and 10%). About one-tenth of plans have efficiency gaps greater 
than 10%, and roughly another one-tenth have efficiency gaps less than -10%, rendering this a 
logical cutoff.66 
 
 Figure 5 is notable in at least two respects. First, and most importantly, for values of the 
Democratic share of the statewide vote near 50%, there are dramatic differences in the median 
DW-Nominate score among plans with pro-Democratic, pro-Republican, and intermediate 
efficiency gaps. At the 50% point, for instance, a plan with a pro-Democratic efficiency gap 
typically has a median DW-Nominate score around -0.2, a plan with an intermediate efficiency 
gap typically has a DW-Nominate median around 0, and a plan with a pro-Republican efficiency 
gap typically has a DW-Nominate median around 0.4. This means that switching from a pro-
Democratic to a pro-Republican plan—while keeping constant the partisan preferences of the 
electorate—shifts the DW-Nominate median by about 0.6, or roughly 2 standard deviations, in a 
conservative direction. This is plainly a very large effect. 
 
 Second, this effect stays similarly large for Democratic vote shares well below 50%, but 
it mostly evaporates for Democratic vote shares well above 50%. In fact, as the Democratic vote 
share approaches 60%, the median DW-Nominate score is almost the same whether a plan has a 
pro-Democratic, a pro-Republican, or an intermediate efficiency gap. This indicates that when 
either party has the advantage in a heavily Democratic state, the additional members it elects are 
not ideologically extreme. Conversely, in a heavily Republican state, extra Democrats (elected 
under a pro-Democratic plan) are quite liberal, while extra Republicans (elected under a pro-
Republican) plan are very conservative.  
 
 Figure 5 suggests that pro-Democratic (pro-Republican) efficiency gaps are associated 
with more liberal (more conservative) congressional delegations, even holding constant states’ 
electoral environments. The model reported in Table 5 in the Appendix confirms this 
expectation.67 The coefficient for the efficiency gap is statistically significant and substantively 
large, controlling for the Democratic share of the statewide vote and including state and year 
fixed effects. In fact, a shift in the efficiency gap from 10% to -10% yields a shift in the median 
DW-Nominate score of about 0.3, or roughly 0.8 standard deviations, in a conservative direction. 
Thus even when a host of additional variables are considered, the impact of the efficiency gap on 
congressional representation remains almost as impressive as in the initial correlational analysis.  
 
                                                 
65 For the sake of symmetry, I truncate the Democratic share of the statewide vote at 40% and 60%. This 
captures about 90% of observations. 
66 Cf. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977) (declaring that “‘under 10%’ [population] deviations . . . 
[are] of prima facie constitutional validity”). 
67 See infra app. tbl.5. 
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 This conclusion is bolstered by the robustness checks also reported in Table 5.68 The 
coefficient for the efficiency gap stays statistically significant—and substantively large—when a 
control is added for the lagged DW-Nominate median and when the dependent variable is 
switched from the median to the average DW-Nominate score of each congressional 
delegation.69 Even when the efficiency gap is replaced as an independent variable by partisan 
bias, the coefficient for the latter is statistically significant and substantively large as well. We 
can therefore be highly confident that district plans’ partisan skews indeed have representational 
consequences. Pro-Democratic plans make House delegations markedly more liberal; pro-
Republican plans do the same but in the opposite direction. 
 




Scatter plot of congressional delegations’ median DW-Nominate scores versus states’ Democratic vote shares in the 
preceding congressional election. Separate lowess curves are plotted for plans with large Democratic efficiency gaps 
(greater than 10%), large Republican efficiency gaps (less than -10%), and intermediate efficiency gaps (between -




 The above findings can be distilled into a series of stylized facts about the causes and 
consequences of gerrymandering. First, unified control of the redistricting process significantly 
benefits the party in charge—indeed, to a greater extent than any other variable. Second, other 
redistricting institutions do not sizably or consistently advantage either party. Third, greater 
                                                 
68 See infra app. tbl.5. 
69 Specifically, a shift in the efficiency gap from 10% to -10% yields a shift in the average DW-Nominate 
score of about 0.13, or roughly 0.0037 standard deviations, in a conservative direction. The DW-Nominate average 
has a smaller standard deviation than the DW-Nominate median (0.2 versus 0.3), likely because in a polarized 




black representation (but not greater Latino representation) leads to slightly larger pro-
Republican skews (but not when Democrats are responsible for redistricting). Fourth, greater 
urbanization yields modestly larger pro-Republican tilts, and this effect is mostly unmediated by 
partisan control. And fifth, the partisan fairness of congressional plans dramatically influences 
the representational distortion of House delegations. 
 
 What do these facts mean for scholars, courts, and reformers? Starting with scholars, the 
results confirm the conclusions of two bodies of existing work. One of these bodies has found, 
using simple comparisons and cross-sectional analyses, that unified control of the redistricting 
process considerably benefits the party in charge.70 This finding turns out to hold even when far 
more data—and far more rigorous techniques—are employed in the analysis.71 The other strand 
in the literature is Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s study showing that large efficiency gaps 
substantially shift state houses’ ideological midpoints as well as states’ enacted policies.72 At 
least with respect to representation, the same is true at the congressional level: pro-Democratic 
(pro-Republican) efficiency gaps strongly push House delegations’ median ideal points to the left 
(right).73 
 
 On the other hand, the results tend to undercut earlier work that has stressed the pro-
Republican implications of minority representation74 and political geography.75 As to minority 
representation, the shares of state house and congressional seats held by America’s largest 
minority group, Latinos, have no effect at all on the efficiency gap. Greater black representation 
does shift the efficiency gap in a Republican direction—but only marginally, by about 1 
percentage point when black seat share increases by a full standard deviation. And even this 
small swing disappears when Democrats are responsible for redistricting.76 Likewise, as to 
political geography, urbanization has a statistically significant and pro-Republican impact at the 
state house level but not at the congressional level. Even at the state house level, a rise in 
urbanization of one standard deviation pushes the efficiency gap by only about 3 percentage 
points in a Republican direction. And such a rise, of course, is highly unrealistic in any 
reasonable timeframe; the average state’s level of urbanization changes by only about 2 
percentage points (or one-seventh of a standard deviation) per decade.77 
 
 Beyond challenging the conventional wisdom in certain respects, and validating it in 
others, the results suggest several promising avenues for future research. First, it would be 
worthwhile to find out if the same conclusions hold for other measures of partisan fairness.78 I 
substituted partisan bias for the efficiency gap as a robustness check in each set of models, and 
determined that this substitution made little substantive difference. But I did not subject partisan 
                                                 
70 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. Note also that Gelman and King used a multiyear model 
with state fixed effects in their analysis. See Gelman & King, supra note 2, at 550. 
71 See supra Parts III.A-B. 
72 See Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 32. 
73 See supra Part III.D. 
74 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
75 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
76 See supra Parts III.A, III.C. 
77 See supra Parts III.A, III.C; see also Census Urbanization Data, supra note 41. 
78 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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bias to the same array of tests as the efficiency gap, and I did not analyze other partisan fairness 
metrics at all. 
 
 Second, it would be advisable to incorporate states’ redistricting criteria—compactness, 
respect for political subdivisions, respect for communities of interest, and so on—into the 
models, as well as data on how closely these criteria are actually heeded. Most states must abide 
by at least some line-drawing requirements, and both the existence and the extent of compliance 
with these rules may affect plans’ partisan fairness.79 And third, as I mentioned earlier, 
urbanization is a suboptimal proxy for political geography because it does not directly capture 
the spatial distribution of Democratic or Republican voters.80 Better metrics do exist, like the 
isolation index (for the average party member living in a given geographic unit, what share of 
her neighbors in the unit belong to the same party) and global Moran’s I (a measure of spatial 
autocorrelation indicating the degree to which Democrats or Republicans are geographically 
clustered).81 However, these metrics have not yet been computed for many states over many 
years because the necessary geocoded, precinct-level election results have not been available. If 
and when this data does become accessible, it may shed more light on how political geography 
and partisan fairness are intertwined. 
 
 Turning from scholars to courts, one of the main arguments advanced by states sued for 
partisan gerrymandering is that their plans’ partisan skews are the product of political geography 
and compliance with the Voting Rights Act—not partisan intent. In Whitford v. Gill, for 
example, Wisconsin claimed (and a dissenting judge agreed) that “urban, more Democratic, 
voters are more closely packed together than suburbanites and farmsteaders, who lean more 
Republican but who are interspersed with lots of Democrats nonetheless.”82 “Wisconsin’s 
political geography” therefore allegedly “result[ed] in hundreds of thousands of ‘wasted’ votes in 
inevitable landslide Democratic victories.”83 Similarly, Wisconsin (and the dissenting judge) 
stressed that many “heavily Democratic inner-city wards in Milwaukee” that were “between 93% 
and 95% Black” were placed in districts that were drawn “with an eye to Voting Rights Act 
concerns.”84 The VRA thus “naturally packed Democratic voters in Milwaukee.”85 
 
  This Article’s findings help to rebut such assertions. As to political geography, not only 
is the impact of urbanization on the efficiency gap comparatively modest, but Wisconsin is not 
even an especially urbanized state. In fact, it is somewhat less urbanized than the average state, 
                                                 
79 For a first pass at this sort of analysis, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 15, at 710-11 (including several 
redistricting criteria in partisan fairness models covering only the 1992-2012 period and lacking fixed effects). See 
also generally JONATHAN WINBURN, THE REALITIES OF REDISTRICTING: FOLLOWING THE RULES AND LIMITING 
GERRYMANDERING IN STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING (2008) (arguing that state requirements that political 
subdivisions be respected reduced gerrymandering in the 2000 cycle). 
80 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
81 See Kenneth R. Mayer, Rebuttal Report: Response to Expert Reports of Sean Trende and Nicholas 
Goedert 16-18 (Mar. 31, 2016) (using both of these metrics to analyze the geographic distribution of Democrats and 
Republicans in Wisconsin). 
82 2016 WL 6837229, at *96 (Griesbach, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at *73. 
84 Id. at *93 n.16, *95 & n.18. 
85 Id. at *93. 
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meaning that its political geography mildly favors Democrats relative to the national mean.86 As 
to VRA compliance, analogously, if greater black representation slightly benefits Republicans in 
Wisconsin, it does so only because Republicans drew the district lines. There would likely be no 
connection between black seat share and partisan fairness if Democrats had been responsible for 
redistricting. Moreover, only 3% of Wisconsin’s state house seats are represented by African 
Americans.87 At this low level of black representation (relative to the country as a whole), the 
variable actually advantages Democrats regardless of the redistricting institution.  
 
 The Article’s relevance to courts, though, may ultimately stem less from these sorts of 
empirical details, and more from the link it establishes between partisan unfairness and 
representational distortion. The only reason for courts to try to police partisan gerrymandering is 
their belief that the practice subverts democratic values and will not cease in the absence of 
judicial intervention.88 Whether the practice subverts democratic values, however, has been an 
open question until now.89 It obviously produces discrepancies between parties’ seat and vote 
shares, but these gaps are not necessarily tantamount to a democratic malfunction. What is 
undeniably a democratic malfunction, though, is representation that does not reflect the 
ideological preferences of the electorate—representation that is much more liberal or much more 
conservative than voters actually want.90 And this is exactly the consequence of gerrymandering 
that the Article documents: at least at the congressional level, large efficiency gaps produce large 
shifts in the ideology of a House delegation’s median member. Courts may therefore rest assured 
that their entry into this political thicket is theoretically justified. Representation itself, not just 
the alignment of parties’ seat and vote shares, is imperiled by gerrymandering. 
 
 This threat is also highly pertinent to reformers. There are many practices that trouble 
good-government advocates: voting restrictions, unrestricted campaign expenditures, closed 
primaries, and so on. But few, if any, of these policies have the same confirmed connection with 
distorted representation as partisan gerrymandering. A strong case can be made, then, that 
reformers should prioritize gerrymandering above other ills that they seek to remedy. Most of 
these other ills do not drive a comparable wedge between voters and their representatives. (Or if 
they do, this effect has yet to be empirically demonstrated.91) 
 
 Equally significantly for reformers, this Article’s findings reveal that redistricting 
commissions do not generally benefit either party when they enact plans. Commissions, of 
course, are good-government advocates’ preferred solution to partisan gerrymandering—an 
                                                 
86 According to the 2010 Census, Wisconsin was 70.2% urbanized, compared to a national average of 
73.6%. See Census Urbanization Data, supra note 41. 
87 As I noted earlier, I coded states’ levels of black and Latino representation in a previous project. See 
supra note 40 and accompanying text.  
88 The canonical work making this argument is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
89 More precisely, it has been an open question at the congressional level. At the state house level, 
Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 32, have already shown that large efficiency gaps influence both the ideal 
point of the median legislator and enacted policy. 
90 At least, this is a malfunction under any democratic theory that values congruence between voters and 
their elected representatives. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 283 (2014). 
91 For an effort to measure the representational consequences of a host of electoral policies, see Nicholas O. 
Stephanopoulos et al., The Realities of Electoral Reform, 68 VAND. L. REV. 761 (2015). 
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institutional response that removes the power to draw district lines entirely from the hands of 
self-interested legislators.92 Commissions, it also turns out, are not a statistically significant 
driver of the efficiency gap at either the state house or the congressional level.93 Nor, according 
to the nearest-neighbor matching, does “treating” an observation by switching from some other 
institution to commission control push the efficiency gap in either party’s direction—not in 
earlier redistricting cycles and not in more recent decades either.94 Reformers, then, should be 
heartened by this information as they lobby for commissions to be adopted in states across the 
country. Based on the historical record, there is little risk that these bodies will inadvertently 




 Recent advances in measuring partisan gerrymandering have not been matched by similar 
progress in understanding the practice’s causes and consequences. Accordingly, this Article 
carries out the most rigorous examination to date of the factors that drive district plans’ partisan 
skews and of these skews’ representational implications. In a nutshell, the Article’s conclusions 
are that single-party control of redistricting fosters partisan unfairness more than any other 
variable, and that such unfairness translates directly into ideologically distorted representation. 
These results are not necessarily surprising, but they establish that, at its core, gerrymandering is 
both a deliberate and a democratically debilitating phenomenon. 
 
  
                                                 
92 See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 14, at 487-91 (presenting the theoretical case for redistricting 
commissions). 
93 See supra Part III.A. 
94 See supra Part III.B. 
95 On the positive side of the ledger, there is also evidence that commissions reduce the size of the 
efficiency gap, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 14, at 496-501, and improve the ideological alignment between the 





TABLE 1: STATE HOUSE ANALYSIS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Main Random Effects Lagged EG Partisan Bias 
          
Unified Democratic 0.0345*** 0.0372*** 0.0222*** 0.0564*** 
 
(0.00839) (0.00937) (0.00614) (0.00946) 
Unified Republican -0.0211** -0.0210** -0.0128** -0.0350*** 
 
(0.00929) (0.0102) (0.00630) (0.00944) 
Commission 0.0194 0.0151 0.0154 0.0104 
 
(0.0126) (0.0127) (0.00962) (0.0133) 
Court 0.00342 0.00120 0.00160 0.00573 
 
(0.00855) (0.00791) (0.00622) (0.00935) 
Black Seat Share -0.211* -0.188** -0.150* -0.508*** 
 
(0.108) (0.0919) (0.0899) (0.184) 
Latino Seat Share -0.127 -0.0615 -0.0571 0.0492 
 
(0.0834) (0.0703) (0.0673) (0.1000) 
Urbanization -0.196** -0.112** -0.153* -0.0506 
 
(0.0935) (0.0452) (0.0798) (0.113) 
Democratic Vote Share 0.156** 0.172** 0.0924 0.809*** 
 
(0.0670) (0.0721) (0.0571) (0.131) 
Seats -0.000393 -0.000177 -0.000643** 0.000184 
 
(0.000291) (0.000150) (0.000261) (0.000303) 




   
(0.0436) 
 Constant 0.120 0.0277 0.122* -0.320*** 
 
(0.0743) (0.0410) (0.0653) (0.100) 
     Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Effects Fixed Random Fixed Fixed 
Standard Errors Clustered Plan State Plan Plan 
     Observations 786 786 745 436 
District Plans 207 207 204 148 
States 41 41 41 38 
R-squared 0.643   0.690 0.707 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 2: CONGRESSIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Main Random Effects Lagged EG Partisan Bias 
          
Unified Democratic 0.0324* 0.0316* 0.0222 0.0412* 
 
(0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0148) (0.0243) 
Unified Republican -0.0459*** -0.0472** -0.0421*** -0.0743*** 
 
(0.0157) (0.0187) (0.0133) (0.0190) 
Commission -0.0365 -0.0349 -0.0318 -0.0724* 
 
(0.0307) (0.0283) (0.0268) (0.0409) 
Court 0.0280* 0.0201 0.0223* 0.00284 
 
(0.0151) (0.0132) (0.0122) (0.0163) 
Black Seat Share -0.154* -0.151* -0.101 -0.0808 
 
(0.0894) (0.0866) (0.0758) (0.147) 
Latino Seat Share 0.0526 0.244 0.153 0.320 
 
(0.178) (0.172) (0.143) (0.304) 
Urbanization -0.364 0.0298 -0.264 0.239 
 
(0.225) (0.0900) (0.207) (0.385) 
Democratic Vote Share 0.105 0.146 -0.0157 1.104*** 
 
(0.112) (0.106) (0.0993) (0.197) 
Seats -0.00275 -0.000964 -0.00295* -0.000556 
 
(0.00207) (0.000730) (0.00165) (0.00285) 




   
(0.0504) 
 Constant 0.102 -0.0797 0.140 -0.676*** 
 
(0.139) (0.0733) (0.124) (0.237) 
     Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Effects Fixed Random Fixed Fixed 
Standard Errors Clustered Plan State Plan Plan 
     Observations 512 512 487 283 
District Plans 136 136 133 112 
States 25 25 25 23 
R-squared 0.456   0.504 0.573 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
25 
 
TABLE 3: MINORITY REPRESENTATION ANALYSIS 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 




      
Unified Democratic 0.0363*** -0.00381 
 
(0.0105) (0.0200) 
Unified Republican -0.00654 -0.0384* 
 
(0.0129) (0.0205) 
Commission 0.0185 -0.0263 
 
(0.0119) (0.0287) 
Court -0.00124 0.0319** 
 
(0.00829) (0.0150) 
Black Seat Share -0.151 -0.348*** 
 
(0.115) (0.116) 
Unified Democratic x Black Seat Share -0.0731 0.424*** 
 
(0.106) (0.152) 
Unified Republican x Black Seat Share -0.209* -0.0776 
 
(0.118) (0.187) 
Latino Seat Share -0.124 0.0757 
 
(0.0841) (0.170) 
Urbanization -0.176* -0.415* 
 
(0.0928) (0.227) 
Democratic Vote Share 0.156** 0.107 
 
(0.0680) (0.100) 
Seats -0.000376 -0.00381* 
 
(0.000284) (0.00206) 
Constant 0.106 0.161 
 
(0.0739) (0.142) 
   Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
State Effects Fixed Fixed 
Standard Errors Clustered Plan Plan 
   Observations 786 512 
District Plans 207 136 
States 41 25 
R-squared 0.646 0.473 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4: URBANIZATION ANALYSIS 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 




      
Unified Democratic -8.30e-05 -0.112 
 
(0.0335) (0.109) 
Unified Republican -0.0301 0.00909 
 
(0.0557) (0.125) 
Commission 0.0226* -0.0254 
 
(0.0128) (0.0320) 
Court 0.00483 0.0313** 
 
(0.00860) (0.0156) 
Black Seat Share -0.213** -0.132 
 
(0.107) (0.0894) 
Latino Seat Share -0.115 0.0655 
 
(0.0921) (0.177) 
Urbanization -0.223** -0.562* 
 
(0.0980) (0.285) 
Unified Democratic x Urbanization 0.0481 0.189 
 
(0.0447) (0.138) 
Unified Republican x Urbanization 0.0137 -0.0726 
 
(0.0717) (0.161) 
Democratic Vote Share 0.165** 0.137 
 
(0.0681) (0.113) 
Seats -0.000401 -0.00218 
 
(0.000300) (0.00219) 
Constant 0.134* 0.225 
 
(0.0755) (0.181) 
   Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
State Effects Fixed Fixed 
Standard Errors Clustered Plan Plan 
   Observations 786 512 
District Plans 207 136 
States 41 25 
R-squared 0.644 0.462 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 5: CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION ANALYSIS 
 










          
Efficiency Gap -1.405*** -1.331*** -0.673*** 
 
 
(0.137) (0.156) (0.0423) 
 Partisan Bias 
   
-1.607*** 
    
(0.188) 
Democratic Vote Share -2.400*** -1.829*** -1.149*** -2.655*** 
 
(0.178) (0.196) (0.169) (0.582) 






  Constant 1.259*** 0.962*** 0.607*** 1.404*** 
 
(0.0937) (0.115) (0.0833) (0.270) 
     Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Effects Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Standard Errors Clustered State State State State 
     Observations 464 439 464 261 
States 25 24 25 23 
R-squared 0.823 0.837 0.942 0.788 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
